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Half-Truths of the First Amendment
Cass R. Sunsteint

Much of the law of free speech is based on half-truths. These
are principles or understandings that have a good deal to offer,
that have fully plausible origins in history and principle, and that
have mostly salutary consequences. But they also have significant
blind spots. The blind spots distort important issues and in the
end disserve the system of free expression.
In this essay, I deal with the four most important of these
half-truths. (1) The First Amendment prohibits all viewpoint discrimination. (2) The most serious threat to the system of free expression consists of government regulation of speech on the basis
of content. (3) Government may "subsidize" speech on whatever
terms it chooses. (4) Content-based restrictions on speech are always worse than content-neutral restrictions on speech. Taken together, these half-truths explain a surprisingly large amount of free
speech law. All in all, they may do more good than harm. But they
also obscure inquiry and at times lead to inadequate outcomes.
The four half-truths are closely related, and it will probably be
beneficial to understand their many interactions. Above all, I suggest that the doctrinal distinctions embodied in the half-truths are
taking on an unfortunate life of their own; it is as if the doctrines
are operating for their own sake. In some ways, the distinctions are
threatening to lose touch with the animating goals of a system of
free expression, prominently including the creation of favorable
conditions for democratic government. Indeed, it sometimes seems
as if free speech doctrine is out of touch with the question of
whether the free speech principle is animated by identifiable goals
at all. My effort to challenge the half-truths is spurred above all by
a belief that whatever else it is about, the First Amendment is at
least partly designed to create a well-functioning deliberative democracy. When free speech doctrine disserves democratic goals,
something is seriously amiss.

t Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School.
Some of the discussion here draws on the more detailed treatment in Cass R. Sunstein,
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (Free Press, 1993).
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HALF-TRUTH NUMBER ONE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROHIBITS
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION

It is commonly said that government may not regulate speech
on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint.1 Indeed, viewpoint discrimination may be the defining example of a violation of the freespeech guarantee. Thus, for example, government may not prohibit
Republicans from speaking on subways, even though government
may be able to prohibit advertising on subways altogether, or even
regulate the content of speech on subways if it does so in a viewpoint-neutral way.
If the First Amendment embodies a per se prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination, then government's first obligation is to
be neutral among different points of view. This principle recently
received prominent vindication in R.A.V. v City of St. Paul,2 in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a "hate-speech" ordinance in
significant part because it embodied viewpoint discrimination.'
The prohibition on viewpoint discrimination has also played a central role in the key modern case on pornography regulation.4
As a description of current free speech law, the first half-truth
has considerable merit: Upon first examination, there are very few
counterexamples, and we can find a good deal of affirmative support for the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. Whatever its
descriptive force, the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination is
not difficult to explain in principle. It can be defended by reference
to two central constitutional concerns: the removal of impermissible reasons for government action; and the ban on skewing effects
on the system of free expression.
The notion that the First Amendment bans skewing effects on
public deliberation seems reasonably straightforward, but the prohibition on impermissible reasons is perhaps less clear. It should
be connected with the requirement that judges be neutral.' A judge
in a civil case may not have a personal stake in the outcome, even

See, for example, American Booksellers Association v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 332 (7th
Cir 1985); R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 112 S Ct 2538 (1992); Geoffrey R. Stone, Antipornography Legislation as Viewpoint Discrimination,9 Harv J L & Pub Pol 461 (1986).
112 S Ct at 2538.

Id at 2547-48. This part of the holding is discussed in Elena Kagan, The Changing
Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 S Ct Rev 29; Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and

the Problem of Free Speech (Free Press, 1993).
Hudnut, 771 F2d at 332.
This analogy is suggested in David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom
of Expression, 91 Colum L Rev 334, 369 (1991).
4
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if that stake would not affect his ruling. This ban on judicial bias
operates regardless of whether it affects the outcome. So too, the
First Amendment is best understood to mean that government, in
its regulatory capacity, may not censor speech on the basis of its
own institutional interests.
How might these ideas justify the ban on viewpoint discrimination? Imagine that a law forbids criticism of the current administration. Here the reasons for government action are most suspicious, for this sort of distortion of debate provides a good reason
for distrusting public officials. The free speech clause declares offlimits certain reasons for censorship, and the ban on viewpoint discrimination seems admirably well-suited to ferreting out those
reasons.

Quite apart from the issue of impermissible reasons, viewpoint
discrimination is likely to impose harmful skewing effects on the
system of free expression. The notion that the First Amendment
bans skewing effects on public deliberation is connected with the
idea that government may not distort the deliberative process by
erasing one side of a debate. Above all, government may not distort the deliberative process by insulating itself from criticism. The
very freedom of the democratic process depends on forbidding that
form of self-insulation.
Thus far I have spoken of government censoring speech about
itself, and this is indeed the most disturbing form of viewpoint discrimination. But even if viewpoint discrimination does not have
this distinctive feature, there may still be cause for concern. Imagine that government says that speech in favor of the antitrust laws
is permitted, but that the opposite message is forbidden; or that
state law prevents people from criticizing affirmative action programs; or that a city concludes the pro-life point of view cannot be
expressed. In these cases, too, the governmental motivation may be
out of bounds and, even more fundamentally, the skewing effects
on the system of free expression may not be tolerable.
From both precedent and principle, it is tempting to conclude
that viewpoint discrimination is always or almost always prohibited. Indeed, the Supreme Court sometimes acts as if that is the
case, and this view may be coming to represent current free speech
orthodoxy. But there are many counterexamples, and these
greatly complicate matters.
6

See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm &

Mary L Rev 189, 227-33 (1983).
7 See R.A.V., 112 S Ct at 2545-48.
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For example, there is a good deal of viewpoint discrimination
in the area of commercial speech. Government can forbid advertising that promotes casino gambling,' even if it does not simultaneously forbid advertising that is opposed to casino gambling. This
prohibition is unquestionably viewpoint-based. Moreover, government can and does forbid advertising in favor of cigarette smoking
on television, 9 although government does not forbid television advertising that is opposed to cigarette smoking. On the contrary,
there is a good deal of such advertising. Precisely the same is true
for advertising relating to alcohol consumption. In commercial
speech, then, there is a good deal of viewpoint discrimination.10
As another example, consider the area of labor law, where
courts have held that government may ban employers from speaking unfavorably about the effects of unionization during the period
before a union election if the unfavorable statements might be interpreted as a threat against workers.11 Regulation of such speech
is plausibly viewpoint discriminatory, because government does
not proscribe employer speech favorable to unionization.
As a final example, consider the securities laws that regulate
proxy statements. Restrictions on viewpoint can be found here,
too, as certain forms of favorable statements about a company's
prospects are banned, while unfavorable views are permitted and
perhaps even encouraged.
Almost no one thinks that there is a constitutional problem
with these various kinds of contemporary viewpoint discrimination. The restrictions are based on such obvious harms that the
notion that the restriction is "viewpoint based" does not even have
time to register. For example, casino gambling, cigarette smoking,
and drinking all pose obvious risks to both self and others. Government controls on advertising for these activities are a means of
s Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 US 328, 344
(1986).
' See Public Health Smoking Act of 1969, 15 USC § 1335 (1988) (prohibiting television
and radio advertising of cigarettes and cigars after January 1, 1971).
10 It would be possible to say that there is no such discrimination, because there is not
quite a category called "advertising against" smoking, or gambling, or alcohol consumption.
On this view, messages that oppose these activities are not really "advertising against," and
hence there is no discrimination on the basis of point of view. This claim might be supported by the fact that ideological messages arguing for smoking in general are not banned.
Perhaps government must be viewpoint-neutral with respect to messages, as it is, and perhaps the ban on advertising does not run afoul of the prohibition. I think that this response
is mostly semantic; it redefines categories to claim that there is no discrimination when in
fact government is suppressing one side of the debate.
" See NLRB v Gissel Packing Co., 395 US 575, 618-19 (1969).

25]
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controlling these risks. It is not entirely implausible to think that a
liberal society should regulate or indeed ban some of these activities,12 though this is extremely controversial, and our government
has generally not chosen to do so. If government has the power to
ban the activity, but has decided instead to permit it, perhaps it
can permit it on the condition that advertising about it be banned.
This was the Supreme Court's reasoning in the casino gambling
13
case.
One could respond that this reasoning is wrong because it permits a distinctively objectionable form of paternalism. Some people think that the First Amendment is undergirded by a principle
of listener autonomy, one that forbids government to ban speech
because listeners might be persuaded by it.'4 On this view, the ban
on advertising for cigarettes, gambling, and alcohol consumption
invades the autonomy of those who would listen to such speech. If
we were serious about the principle of listener autonomy, perhaps
we would rarely allow government to stop people from hearing
messages. This is a reasonable position, but it is not relevant to my
current claim, which is purely descriptive: laws that discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint are indeed upheld in certain
circumstances.
It is here that the first proposition emerges as a half-truth.
Viewpoint discrimination is indeed permitted, and the Court
should not pretend that it is always banned.' 5 We might conclude
from the cases that viewpoint discrimination is not always prohibited and that the Court instead undertakes a more differentiated
inquiry into the nature and strength of government justifications
in particular cases. What is the nature of that more differentiated
inquiry? I suggest that it begins with the view that viewpoint discrimination creates a strong presumption of invalidity. In certain
narrow circumstances, the presumption is overcome because (a)
there is at most a small risk of illegitimate motivation, (b) low-

"

1987).

See Robert E. Goodin, No Smoking: The Ethical Issues (University of Chicago Press,

iS Posadas,478 US at 345-46. The Court said that when the Constitution protects the
subject of advertising restrictions, the state cannot prohibit such advertising. Id at 345. In
the case at hand, however, the Court noted that the Constitution does not prohibit the
Puerto Rican legislature from banning casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico.
"[T]he greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban advertising of casino gambling." Id at 345-46.
" See, for example, Strauss, 91 Colum L Rev at 334 (cited in note 5); T. M. Scanlon, A
Theory of Free Expression, 1 Phil & Pub Aff 204 (1972). See also Ronald M. Dworkin, The
Coming Battles Over Free Speech, NY Rev of Books 55 (June 11, 1992).
1"R.A.V., 112 S Ct at 2547-48, seems to state this.
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value or unprotected speech is at issue, (c) the skewing effect on
the system of free expression is minimal, and (d) the government is
able to make a powerful showing of harm. In the commercial
speech cases, for example, we are dealing with low-value speech,
and the risk of illegitimate motivation is small. In the case of securities regulation, there is no substantial skewing effect on free
expression, and there is a highly plausible claim that government is
protecting people against deception.
For present purposes, it is not necessary to devote a good deal
of attention to these various considerations. My point is only that
current law does not embody a flat ban on viewpoint discrimination. Certain forms of discrimination are found fully acceptable.
They are not seen in this way only. because the presence of realworld harms obscures the existence of selectivity. The pretense
embodied in our first half-truth has impaired the analysis of a
number of free speech issues, including those raised by hate speech
and pornography. Instead of relying on a per se rule, we should
decide such cases by inquiring more particularly into the nature,
legitimacy, and strength of government justifications. There may
be sufficiently neutral justifications for apparent viewpoint discrimination in some such areas. I do not, however, suggest such
justifications here.' 6
II.

HALF-TRUTH NUMBER

Two:

THE REAL THREAT TO THE

SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION COMES FROM CONTENT-BASED
GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH

The second half-truth is a generalization of the first. It derives
from the same basic framework. I think that it is even more misleading; in any case, it is the most important.
Our free-speech tradition, it is commonly said, is especially
hostile to content-based restrictions on speech.'" The principal recent exponents of this view see such restrictions as the most important obstacles to the system of free expression.' 8 It is as if the
other obstacles are invisible, or not worth attention at all. Indeed,
the Court itself treats these restrictions as the defining illustra" I do try to do this in Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (cited in
note 3); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law, 92 Colum L Rev 1, 13-29
(1992). See also Akhil Reed Arnar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 106 Harv L Rev 124, 151-60 (1992).
1 See Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 196-97 (cited in note 6). See also Harry Kalven,
Jr., A Worthy Tradition 6-19 (Harper & Row Publishers, 1988).
18 I draw here upon Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 194-233, 251-52 (cited in note 6);
Kalven, A Worthy Tradition at 6-19 (cited in note 17).
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tions of threats to democratic self-governance. 9 Although there is
much to be said for this idea as a matter of principle, it is in large
part an artifact of our particular history. The free speech tradition
in America grows out of the clear-and-present-danger cases featuring the powerful dissenting opinions of Justices Brandeis and
Holmes,2" and culminating in the great case of Brandenburg v
Ohio."1 In all of these cases, the government attempted to censor
political speech on the basis of its content.
The image bequeathed to the American legal tradition by
these cases is exceptionally pervasive. It suggests that the real
threats to free expression are indeed a result of content-based regulation of speech. Outside of the arguably distinctive context of
politics, government censorship of literature and the arts also attests to the dangers of content-based regulation. The symbolic
power of the great Brandeis and Holmes dissents is unrivalled, but
other defining cases involve content-based restrictions as well.
Consider in this connection the famous Ulysses litigation 22 and the
more recent, highly publicized case involving the work of Robert
Mapplethorpe.2 s
The antipathy to content-based regulation thus derives great
support from history. Moreover, it is not hard to see the basis for
the antipathy. If we are fearful of illegitimate reasons for government regulation, or if we are concerned about skewing effects from
regulation, then content-based regulation is especially dangerous.
The basis for these judgments has been spelled out in great
and often convincing detail.2 4 Throughout the twentieth century,
' See, for example, New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964).
20

See Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes dissenting) ("It is only

the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress
in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country."); Whitney v
California, 274 US 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis concurring) (The state may not place restrictions on speech "unless [such] speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and
imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State constitutionally may seek to
prevent[.]").
395 US 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
22 See United States v One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F2d 705 (2d Cir 1934). See also
Edward de Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere: The Law of Obscenity and the Assault on
Genius (Vintage Books, 1993), which recounts the historical saga of the publication of
Uly~ses in the United States.
23 See Contemporary Arts Center v Ney, 735 F Supp 743 (S D Ohio 1990).
24 See Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 217-27 (cited in note 6); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46, 54-57 (1987); Laurence H. Tribe, Ameri-
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major dangers have come from government regulations designed to
impose on the polity a uniformity of opinion, to stifle artistic or
literary diversity, and to entrench the government's own self-interest. In an era in which many countries are emerging from communist rule, it is especially salutary to focus on the risks posed by
content-based regulation of speech.
But is it correct to say that the greatest threats to free expression stem from content-based regulation of speech? In contemporary America, I believe that an affirmative answer will divert attention from other important issues. Under current conditions, the
second half-truth may even have become an anachronism. It renders other problems invisible. It sees the First Amendment
through the wrong prism. It focuses attention on comparatively
trivial problems-pornography prosecutions, commercial speech,
private libel-and loses sight of the large picture.
Consider, for example, a conventional view about freedom of
expression. If we were to examine recent books on this topic, we
would generally find a firm consensus that the system of free expression is at risk to the extent that government censors sexuallyexplicit speech, purportedly dangerous speech, or commercial
speech on the basis of its content.2 5 The war against Ulysses is said
to have found a modern parallel in the attack on violent pornography. The effort to deter a civil-rights advertisement through use of
libel law in New York Times Co. v Sullivan" is said to be fundamentally the same as the continuing application of libel law to
falsehoods about private people.2 The restriction of the speech of
political dissidents is said to have a modern analogue in the regulation of false and misleading commercial speech.2 8
Views of this sort are widespread. Moreover, it may even be
right to say that the principal threats to free speech come from
content-based restrictions; but the claim needs to be evaluated by
reference to some sort of criteria. It should not be treated as an

can ConstitutionalLaw ch 12 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1988); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 Harv L Rev 1482 (1975).
25 See, for example, de Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere (cited in note 22) (discussing government censorship of authors and publishers); Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in
an Open Society 3-17 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992); Anthony Lewis, Make No Law (Random
House, 1991); Nat Hentoff, Free Speech For Me-But Not For Thee (Aaron Asher Books,
1992).
11 376 US at 254.
$7 See Dworkin, NY Rev of Books at 62-64 (cited in
note 14).
"8 See Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va L
Rev 627, 644 (1990).

25]
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axiom. Let me suggest provisionally that we should evaluate any
system of free expression at least in part by attending to two matters: the amount of attention devoted to public issues and the expression of diverse views on those issues. Use of these criteria accords well with the original Madisonian vision of the First
Amendment.2 9 It also draws support from a range of important
writings, most prominently those of Alexander Meiklejohn. 0 Many
people are skeptical of the idea that the free speech principle
should be understood wholly through the lens of democracy." But
one need not think that the First Amendment is exclusively or
even primarily connected with democratic self-government in order
to conclude. that something is wrong if the system deals little with
public issues and contains little diversity of views.
If these are our governing criteria, I suggest that the principal
current problem is not content-based restrictions on speech but
rather a speech "market" in which these values are poorly served.
It is comparatively unimportant if the government is overzealous
in its regulation of child pornography, or if government regulates
commercial advertising that is not terribly deceptive. But it is far
from unimportant if the system of free expression produces little
substantive attention to public issues, or if people are not exposed
to a wide diversity of views. If we are interested in ensuring such
attention and such exposure, we may not be entirely pleased with
the operation of the so-called free market in speech.
In large part, this claim is a factual one. To evaluate the claim,
we need to have a very thorough empirical understanding of the
free speech "status quo," and here there is a distressingly large gap
in the free speech literature. There are few more important tasks
for the study of free expression than to compile information on
existing free speech fare. But a number of things do seem clear.32
" See, generally, Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (cited in note

3).

so Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 27 (Harper

& Brothers Publishers, 1948) ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the
necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the
abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be
decided by universal suffrage."). See also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1 (1971); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 Iowa L Rev .1405, 1409-10 (1986).
11 See, for example, Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 591
(1982).
0' 1 draw here on Phyllis C. Kaniss, Making Local News (University of Chicago Press,
1991); Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (cited in note 3). An especially
valuable empirical treatment is C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a DemocraticPress, 140 U
Pa L Rev 2097 (1992).
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In most of the broadcasting that people watch, there is exceedingly
little attention to public issues. The "soundbite" phenomenon assures that during electoral campaigns, public attention will be focused on marginally relevant matters-the "Murphy Brown" controversy, escalating allegations of various kinds-rather than on
the real issues at stake. Such attention as there is often centers on
sensationalistic anecdotes, usually with an unwarranted whiff of
scandal.
Coverage of public issues often involves misleading "human
interest" anecdotes, in which people are asked how they "feel"
about policies that appear to have harmed them. Frequently public
issues are entirely absent. For example, the local news sometimes
consists of discussion about the movie that immediately preceded
it. Marketplace pressures, including the desires of advertisers, encourage the press to avoid substantive controversy. Often advertisers affect content, partly by discouraging serious discussion of public affairs, partly by avoiding sponsoring controversial programming, and partly by encouraging a favorable context for their products. 38 In the place of genuine diversity of view, offering perspectives from different positions, most of the broadcasting that people
watch typically consists of a bland, watered down version of conventional morality. It would therefore be extremely surprising if
commercial television were able to take a firm "pro-choice" or
"pro-life" position in a news special or a prime-time movie, or a
strong defense or critique of affirmative action.
In these circumstances, some major threats to a well-functioning system of free expression, defined in Madisonian terms, come
not from content-based regulation, but from free markets in
speech. Market pressures are compromising the two goals of a system of free expression. This is of course only a contingent fact. It is
a product of a particular constellation of the current forces of supply and demand. If market forces were different, we might see a
great deal of attention to public issues and a large amount of diversity of view. But under current conditions, this is hardly the
case.
We might go further. The contemporary problem lies not
merely in market forces, as if these were brute natural facts, but
more precisely in the legal rules that underlie and constitute those
markets. Broadcasters and newspapers are of course given property
rights in their media. Without such government grants, the speech

" See Baker, 140 U Pa L Rev at 2139-68 (cited in note 32).

25]
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market would be entirely different. It is these rights-generally of
exclusive use-that make it possible for owners to exclude people
who would like to speak and be heard. If a critic of a war, or of Roe
v Wade,3 4 cannot get onto network television, it is not because of
nature or "private power," but because legal rules prevent him
from doing so. Property laws at both the federal and state levels
make any efforts to obtain access to television airwaves a civil or
criminal trespass.
Market forces are a product of law, including the law that allocates entitlements. That law, like all other, should be assessed for
conformity to the First Amendment. The law of property, granting
rights of exclusive use, is of course content-neutral rather than
content-based. When CBS excludes someone from the airwaves, it
is not because government has made a conscious decision to exclude a particular point of view. But it is also untrue to say (as
current law perhaps does) 5 that government is not involved, that
we have a problem of "private power," or that there is no state
action for free speech purposes. There is a content-neutral restriction on speech. The question is whether that content-neutral restriction is helping or harming the system of free expression. To
make this assessment, we should compare it with other possible
systems. Alternatives might include a "fairness doctrine" that calls
for attention to public issues and diversity of view; a point system
creating incentives to license applicants who promise to cover important issues; a system of subsidies and penalties designed to increase coverage of important issues; or legal restrictions on the
power of advertisers over programming content.3 6
If our current system of free expression is functioning poorly,
it is because of the content-neutral law that underlies current markets. I believe that many important problems for the current system of free speech in America lie not in content-based regulation-which generally involves peripheral issues and almost never
strikes at what I am taking to be the core of the free speech guarantee-but instead in the operation of the free market and in the
legal rules that constitute it. In these circumstances, it is worse
than ironic that people interested in the theory and practice of free
speech focus on such comparatively trivial issues as commercial
speech, disclosure of the names of rape victims, and controls on

410 US 113 (1973).
88 CBS v Democratic Nati Committee, 412 US 94 (1973).
6 For details, see Baker, 140 U Pa L Rev at 2178-2219 (cited in note 32); Sunstein,
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (cited in note 3).
84

36 -

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1993:

questions for the system of free expresobscenity. The principal
37
elsewhere.
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III.

HALF-TRUTH NUMBER THREE: GOVERNMENT "PENALTIES" ON
SPEECH ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM SELECTIVE FUNDING
OF SPEECH

In the next generation, some of the most important free
speech issues will arise from selective funding of speech. What if
government funds some artists but not others, imposes conditions
on what libraries may obtain, or regulates political expression by
refusing to pay for the literature of certain causes? On the constitutional question, the Supreme Court's cases are exceptionally
hard to unpack. We might distinguish five different propositions,
which in concert seem to reflect the current law.3a Once we have
them in place, we will be able to see the key role of the third halftruth.
(A) Government is under no obligation to subsidize speech.
Government can refuse to fund any and all speech-related activities. In this sense, it can remain out of the speech market
altogether.
(B) Government may speak however it wishes. Public officials
can say what they want. There is no free speech issue if officials
speak. Speech of this kind "abridges" the speech of no one else.
(C) Government may not use its power over funds or other
benefits so as to pressure people to relinquish rights that they
"otherwise" have. This is an obscure idea in the abstract, but it
can be clarified through some examples. Government could not say
that as a condition for receiving welfare, people must vote for a
certain political party. Government could not tell people that if
they are to have drivers' licenses, they must agree not to criticize
the President. In both cases, government makes funding decisions
so as to deprive people of rights of expressive liberty that they
would otherwise have.
But-and this is an important qualification-government may
indeed "condition" the receipt of funds, or other benefits, on some
limitation on rights, if the condition is reasonably related to a neu-

' See Lee C. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press chs 2, 5 (University of Chicago Press,
1991); Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press 107-33 (University of Chicago Press, 1947) ("Hutchins Report").
88 Rust v Sullivan, 111 S Ct 1759 (1991) (allowing selective subsidy); Harris v McRae,
448 US 297 (1980) (same); FCC v League of Women Voters, 468 US 364 (1984) (banning
penalty).
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tral, noncensorial interest. For example, the government could forbid you from working for the CIA unless you agree not to write
about your CIA-related activities, or could prevent you from political campaigning if you work for the federal government. 9 In both
cases, the government has legitimate justifications that do not involve censorship. Its limitation on CIA employees is designed to
ensure the successful operation of the CIA, which entails a measure of secrecy. Its limitation on government employees is designed
to ensure that political campaigning does not compromise basic
government functions. Of course this principle will create some difficult line-drawing problems.
(D) Government may not "coerce" people by fining or imprisoning them if they exercise their First Amendment rights. Fines
and imprisonment are the most conventional examples of free
speech violations. They do not raise "unconstitutional conditions"
40
issues at all, and may be approached far more straightforwardly.
(E) The government may apparently be selective in its funding choices. In other words, government may direct its resources as
it chooses, so long as it does not run afoul of principles (C) and (D)
above. Government may give funding only to those projects, including those speaking projects, of which it approves. Thus government may fund art, literature, or legal and medical care and impose limits on the grantees, even on their speech, if the limits
regard what may be done with government money.
Rust v Sullivan, a highly controversial Supreme Court decision, is the source of this last proposition. 4 1 In Rust, the Court suggested that so long as government is using its own money, and not
affecting "private" expression, it can channel its funds however it
wishes. The problem arose when the Department of Health and
Human Services issued regulations banning federally-funded family-planning services from engaging in (a) counseling concerning,
(b) referrals for, and (c) activities advocating abortion as a method
of family planning. The plaintiffs claimed, among other things,
that these restrictions on abortion-related speech violated the First
Amendment. In particular, they argued that the restrictions discriminated on the basis of point of view. The Court disagreed,

'9 Snepp v United States, 444

US 507 (1980).
" I will question this view below.
41

111

S Ct at 1759.
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holding:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities
it believes to be in the public interest, without at the
same time funding an alternate program which seeks to
deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the
42
exclusion of the other.

In response to the claim that the regulations conditioned the receipt of a benefit on the relinquishment of a right, the Court held
that "here the government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but
is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.

'43

Rust seems to establish the important principle that government can allocate funds to private people to establish "a program"
that accords with government's preferred point of view. In this
area, even viewpoint discrimination is permitted. In fact, the Court
seems to make a sharp distinction between government "coercion"-entry into the private realm of markets and private interactions-on the one hand and funding decisions on the other. Hence
we arrive at our third half-truth: Government may not "penalize"
speech (propositions (C) and (D)), but it may fund speech selectively however it chooses, by allocating its funds to preferred
causes (propositions (A) and (E)).
This view captures an enduring principle, one that will inevitably play a role in the constitutional law of freedom of expression.
Often government has legitimate justifications for treating funding
decisions differently from criminal punishments. As noted, it may
conclude that people who work for the CIA must refrain from
speaking on certain matters, on the ground that the speech could
compromise national security. Hence government could conclude
"' Id at 1772. The Court added:
To hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages
alternate goals, would render numerous government programs constitutionally
suspect. When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, 22 USC § 4411(b), it was
not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of
political philosophy such as Communism and Fascism.
Id at 1773.
" Id at 1774.
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that if it is to provide people with the benefit of CIA employment,
it may condition their speech. So too, the President could conclude
that Cabinet-level employees must speak in ways of which the
President approves. Without imposing this kind of condition on
speech, the President's power to execute the laws would be severely compromised. The condition is therefore acceptable. It can
be justified by reference to sufficiently neutral justifications.
But the sharp distinction between penalties and subsidies is
inadequate. It is far too simple. It sets out the wrong sets of categories. Most generally, there are no such fundamental distinctions
among the law that underlies markets, the law that represents disruption of markets, and the law thatcalls for funding decisions. All
are law, and the First Amendment directs us to assess each in
terms of its purposes and effects.
To make the point a bit more dramatically: All constitutional
speech cases are in an important sense unconstitutional conditions
cases. When the government says that someone will be fined for
speaking-our category (D) above-it in effect imposes an unconstitutional condition. It is generally saying that your property-which is, as a matter of fact, governmentally conferred"
-may be held only on condition that you refrain from speaking.
To be sure, a case of this sort is not seen as one of unconstitutional
conditions at all. But this is only because existing holdings of property are seen, wrongly, as pre-political and pre-legal. To support
the outcome in category (D), it would be more precise to say that a
condition is usually unconstitutional when government is using its
power over property that it has created through law to deprive you
of something to which you are otherwise entitled-and you are always otherwise entitled to property that you now own. But to put
things in this way would be to place funding cases and other cases
on the same analytic ground. The sharp split drawn in Rust is
therefore misconceived. It is here that the distinction between penalties and subsidies is merely a half-truth.
We may go further. The First Amendment question is not
whether there is a subsidy or a penalty. For two reasons, it is
wrong to ask that question. First, the question is exceedingly hard

"

This has no normative implications. By saying that property rights are a creation of

law, I do not mean in any way to disparage the institution of private property, which is
crucially important to, among other things, individual liberty, economic prosperity, and
democratic self-government. I mean only to suggest that to have a system of private property, government controls are necessary, as people in Eastern Europe have recently learned
very well.
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to answer; it forces us to chase ghosts. Second, it is essentially irrelevant.4 5 We might have a perfectly acceptable "penalty," and we
might have an impermissible refusal to subsidize.
The first problem is that in order to decide whether there is a
subsidy or a penalty, we need a baseline to establish the ordinary
or normatively-privileged state of affairs. When government denies
Medicaid benefits to artists, has it penalized speech, or has it refused to subsidize it? We cannot answer that question without saying what it is that artists are "ordinarily" or "otherwise" entitled
to have.4" The Constitution does not really answer that question,
and without a textual resolution it is very difficult for courts to
resolve it on their own.
More important, the First Amendment does not say that
"penalties" on speech are always prohibited and that "subsidies"
are always allowed. Even if we could tell the difference between
the two, we would not have accomplished very much. Perhaps government can "penalize" speech when it has legitimate justifications
for doing so. Perhaps government must sometimes subsidize
speech when its failure to do so is grounded on an impermissible
reason. The notions of penalty and subsidy seem to truncate analysis at a too early stage.
I do not claim that funding decisions affecting speech should
be treated "the same" as other sorts of government decisions that
affect speech-whatever this ambiguous claim might mean. The
development of constitutional limits on funding that interferes
with expression raises exceedingly complex issues. But for now, we
have reason to doubt whether our third half-truth, and Rust,
would be taken to their logical extreme. Can it seriously be argued
that government could fund the Democratic Convention but refuse
to fund the Republican Convention? Is it even possible that government could give grants only to academic projects reflecting governmentally-preferred viewpoints? More likely, Rust will come to
be understood as a case involving private counselling rather than
public advocacy, in the distinctive context in which a ban on abortion counselling is ancillary to a ban on the performance of abortions. It will not be taken to authorize government selectively to
subsidize one point of view in a controversy over some public issue.

" See Kagan, 1992 S Ct Rev at 30 (cited in note 3); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1413 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution
ch 11 (Harvard University Press, 1993).
,1 See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Sidney Morgenbesser, ed, Philosophy, Science and
Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel 440 (St. Martin's Press, 1969).
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In short: Adherence to the First Amendment requires an analysis of the effects of selective funding on the system of free expression, and of the legitimacy of the government justifications for selectivity. A sharp split between penalties and subsidies will not do
the job; some penalties are acceptable and some selective subsidies
are not. The third half-truth is thus rooted in anachronistic ideas
about the relationship between the citizen and the state. It poses a
genuine threat to free speech under modern conditions.
IV.

HALF-TRUTH NUMBER FOUR: CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS
ON SPEECH ARE WORSE THAN CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
ON SPEECH

We arrive finally at the last and most general half-truth. From
what has been said thus far, it should be clear that the Supreme
Court is especially skeptical of content-based restrictions and especially hospitable, toward content-neutral restrictions. 7 Contentbased -restrictions are presumed invalid. Outside the relatively narrow categories of unprotected or less protected speech-libel, commercial speech, fighting words, and so on-the Court rarely upholds content-based restrictions. By contrast, content-neutral
restrictions are upheld so long as they can survive a form of balancing. In undertaking that balancing, the Court is often highly
deferential to government judgments about the need for contentneutral restrictions. One of the most striking developments in recent law is the Court's increased hostility to content-based restrictions and its increased deference to content-neutral ones. Indeed,
the distinction between the two kinds of restrictions seems to become sharper every term. Thus it is striking to compare the recent
invalidation of a relatively narrow content-based restriction-the
ban on cross-burning-with the recent validation of a broad content-neutral restriction-the ban on solicitation in airports.4
49
There is much to be said in favor of this fourth half-truth.
As noted, it does tend to capture current law. Moreover, it makes
considerable sense as a matter of principle. Generalizing only
slightly from the previous discussion of viewpoint-based restrictions, we might conclude that content-based restrictions are pecuSee generally Stone, 54 U Chi L Rev at 54-117 (cited in note 24).
R.A.V., 112 S Ct at 2547-49, discussed in text accompanying notes 2 and 3; Intl
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v Lee, 112 S Ct 2701, 2705-09 (1992) (holding that
an airport terminal is not a public forum and that the port authority's ban on solicitation
was a reasonable means of minimizing inconvenience and disruption of travelers).
9 See Stone, 54 U Chi L Rev at 54-57 (cited in note 24).
47

48 See
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liarly likely to stem from an illegitimate government reason, and
peculiarly likely to have intolerable skewing effects on the system
of free expression. A law that forbids AIDS-related advertising on
subways, for example, is more objectionable than a law that forbids
all advertising on subways. Content-neutral restrictions are far
more trustworthy, for the reasons for regulation are apt to be more
legitimate and the skewing effects less worrisome. On this basis, a
legal system could do far worse than to set out a presumption
against content-based restrictions and a presumption in favor of
content-neutral ones.
These presumptions should not, however, be pressed too hard.
There are cases in which content-neutral restrictions are especially
damaging, and cases in which content-based restrictions are not so
bad. Suppose, for example, that government forbids all speech in
airports, train stations, and bus terminals. Here we will have a fundamental intrusion on processes of public deliberation. Indeed, one
of the most effective strategies of tyrants is to limit the arenas in
which public- deliberation can take place. Surely this sort of intrusion is more severe than what arises when, for example, small public universities ban a narrow category of racial hate speech. The
content-neutral restriction may seriously restrict the number of expressive outlets and thus impair the system of democratic deliberation. It may also have content differential effects: when people are
prevented from engaging in door-to-door canvassing, or from using
public parks, there are severe adverse effects on poorly financed
causes. Moreover, some content-based regulation-consider a limited ban on racial hate speech or narrow classes of violent pornography-is at least plausibly a modestly intrusive corrective to an
already content-based status quo. Whether or not such contentbased regulations should be upheld, it seems wrong to think that
regulations of this sort are automatically more objectionable than
regulations that are content-neutral.
I do not suggest that the distinction between content-based
and content-neutral regulations is a failure, or that it should be
abandoned. The danger arises if the doctrine becomes too rigid
and mechanical. There is a risk, for example, that the current
Court will become exceptionally receptive to content-neutral restrictions on speech, giving them the strongest presumption of validity. It is possible that something of this kind has already occurred. There is also a risk that outside of a few narrow categories,
the Court will invalidate all content-based restrictions without
looking seriously at the reasons for regulation in the particular
case. But many content-neutral restrictions have extremely harm-
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ful consequences and some content-based restrictions are founded
on adequate justifications. The fourth half-truth is dangerous
above all because in its rigidity, it operates as a substitute for close
analysis of particular problems.5 0
CONCLUSION

With any well-elaborated body of legal doctrine, there is a pervasive danger that the doctrinal lines and distinctions will take on
a life of their own. The purposes and goals that gave rise to those
lines and distinctions sometimes become increasingly remote. This
is, I believe, the source of the problem with all four half-truths.
The larger goals of free speech doctrine have often been abandoned in favor of continued attention to particular doctrines that
serve those goals in only partial and indirect ways.
It is of course possible to debate the content of those larger
goals. Much ink has been spilled on that highly-contested question." But we need not enter into especially controversial territory
in order to assert that at least a part of the justification for a
strong free speech principle is its contribution to the American
conception of self-government. This conception-associated with
the Madisonian view of free speech-helps explain the persistence
of each of our half-truths. All of them can be seen at least in part
as efforts to protect against skewing effects on democratic deliberation and illegitimate government efforts at self-insulation. It is for
this reason that the propositions I have discussed can fairly be described as half-truths, rather than as simple illusions.
But the four half-truths have indeed taken on a life of their
own, and in important ways they disserve the system of free expression. In their generality and abstractness, they distract attention from current threats to the system of free expression and,
even worse, they threaten to make those threats invisible as such.
One of the extraordinary characteristics of the American system of
free expression is its capacity to grow and change over time. If the
50 Of course, it may sometimes be worthwhile to insist on rules that are crude but that
reduce the costs of individualized inquiry. Some of the oversimplification in free speech law
might be justified on this ground.
" See, for example, Scanlon, 1 Phil & Pub Aff at 204 (cited in note 14) (autonomy
theory); T. M. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U Pitt L
Rev 519 (1979) (partial retraction of that theory); Strauss, 91 Colum L Rev at 334 (cited in
note 5) (autonomy theory); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications,89 Colum L Rev
119 (1989) (overview of theory of free speech value); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A
PhilosophicalInquiry chs 2-5 (Cambridge University Press, 1982) (same); Redish, 130 U Pa
L Rev at 591 (cited in note 31) (autonomy theory).
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system is to promote democratic goals in the twenty-first century, I
suggest that the four half-truths should be recognized not only for
their contributions to human liberty, but also for their limitations
and their damaging effects on some of the most important current
free speech controversies.

